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tion either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to
maximize their proÞts. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market
making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of
the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more
of their private information. The presence of different types of information de-
creases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators
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1 Introduction
Agents engaged in trading activities might have access to different sources of informa-
tion: information about fundamentals or information about supply. The existence of
different types of information might reduce the inefficiencies that appear when agents
are trading on private information about fundamentals. One of the reasons these in-
efficiencies occur is the fact that market makers respond to the existence of traders
with private information by reducing the liquidity of the market. However, it is the
private information itself which generates these inefficiencies and not necessarily the
market mechanism. In this paper we analyze the process through which different types
of information are transmitted to prices and how this affects market performance. We
develop a model of insider trading in the context of an imperfectly competitive market
where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply
(different types of information that may inßuence the security prices at any point in
time). In an imperfect competitive equilibrium prices are less informative than in a
competitive rational expactations equilibrium. This is due mainly to the fact that
a strategic trader exploits his informational advantage taking into account the effect
the quantity he chooses is expected to have on both the price and the other informed
traders strategy. This effect is even more important when in the market there exist
two types of information. As a result, we study how strategic trading on two types of
information affects market liquidity, informational efficiency of prices and other market
indicators in this new setup.
We use the framework developed by Kyle (1985, 1989) which have become a stan-
dard for analyzing strategic noisy rational expectations markets. Kyles (1985) model
explains how a risk neutral informed trader exploits his informational advantage by be-
having strategical and shows that the smoothing behaviour of the trader leads to prices
that have constant volatility as the time periods become shorter to approach a contin-
uous auction. An important generalization of the Kyles model is to allow for multiple
informed traders. Since the monopolist trader makes positive proÞts it follows that
other trader might be willing to acquire information. Foster and Wiswanathan (1993)
and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) explore this restriction of a single informed
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trader and point out the contrast between the case of a monopolist and the one of
multiple traders. Thus, Foster and Wiswanathan (1993) extend Kyles model to many
traders and a larger class of distributions but obtain that Kyles result that the informed
trader can make positive proÞts does not hold anymore. On the other hand, Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) conclude that competition between informed traders leads
to fully revelation of information. Kyle (1989), to which our work is closely related, pro-
poses an imperfect competition model in which there are noise traders, price informed
traders and uninformed traders. He shows that a strategic trader acts as he trades
against a residual supply curve. This implies lower quantities by comparison with the
competitive rational expectations equilibrium and, consequently, in equilibrium prices
reveal less information than in the competitive case. As it will be emphasized in this
paper, in the case we have different types of information the dual role of prices to
aggregate information and clear the market is even more important.
In the Kyle-type models an important assumption is the presence of noise. As it
was already explained by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), noise is needed in the model
to prevent prices to be fully revealing. They show that in a model in which agents
are price takers and prices are fully revealed no agent will be willing to acquire costly
information. To overcome this difficulty several ways to introduce noise were used:
adding noise traders, considering uncertainty which has a dimension greater than that
of price, or assuming that the aggregate endowment is imperfectly observed. We use
this last approach by assuming a random supply. The presence of shocks in supply
has a signiÞcant price impact. A supply shock leads to a change in prices and this
determines the investors to revise their expectations. However, if the supply shock is
observable by the supply informed traders, these traders make use of their informa-
tional advantage and therefore, are willing to adjust their demand. Consequently, we
assume that there exists a supply informed trader who receives a signal about supply.
This approach was used before by Gennotte and Leland (1990) who consider a model
were speculators posses private and diverse information.1 They consider price takers
1A similar assumption is that market makers have some information about the uninformed order
ßow and it can be found in Admati and Pßeiderer (1991) and Madhavan (1992). Palomino (2001)
considers also a setup where the informed agents have information both about the liquidation value
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speculators who gather information either about prices or about supply and show that
these informational differences can cause Þnancial markets to be relatively illiquid. Our
model builds on the assumption of Gennotte and Leland (1990) about the existence of
a random supply and informed supply speculator but we consider an imperfect com-
petition setup with both price informed and supply informed agents where the agents
submit limit orders. In general dealers observe order ßow and collect information from
multiple sources. Therefore, we can think of the supply informed agent as being a
dealer who can observe the order ßow. As pointed out by Brown and Zhang (1997),
despite of the fact that dealers may be better informed than other traders, in a com-
petitive market they cannot earn rents on the information on the order ßow. This is
due to the fact that price informed agents use their informational advantage to make
gains on the expense of dealers. However, we will see that in our setup of an imperfect
competitive market dealers can aggregate the information from trading and use it to
earn speculative proÞts. Thus, the dealers can learn about the liquidation value of
the asset from the orders placed by the price informed agents. The information rev-
elation is increased signiÞcantly in our setup since the agents are placing limit orders
and therefore, they condition their demands on prices and infer in this way a part of
others information. We assume here that there is only one supply informed trader.
Made for simplicity, the assumption is in line with the result obtained by Ellis et al.
(2001). They show that in general, one dealer tends to dominate the trading on a stock
(executing a little more than half of the days volume). They also answer the question
who is the dominant dealer. Depending on the time passed from the offer day, the
dominant dealer might be the underwriter, a wholesaler or a generic market maker.
In the rational expectations paradigm traders understand that prices reveal the
information they have when they choose the quantities to be traded. The link between
information and prices via trades provides an explicit mechanism for information trans-
mission between traders. The existence of private information means that a trader may
have incentives to act strategically in order to maximize his proÞts. Therefore, given
his private information, a trader maximizes his conditional expected proÞts taking into
account the effect of his trading on prices and taking as given the strategies other
and the quantity traded by one of the noise traders.
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traders use to chose their demand schedules. As in the imperfect competition model of
Kyle (1989) we assume further that all the speculators choose strategically the amounts
they trade. Therefore, the supply informed speculator will also chose his demand tak-
ing into account the effect of his trading on prices and revealing a part of information
about the shock in supply to the other market participants. As a result, in our model
both the information about the value of the asset or about supply is revealed through
the quantities to be traded.
We are interested to understand the effects of different types of information on
market liquidity, informativeness of prices, price volatility, and the ability of informed
traders to exploit their private information. Our goal is to see how market liquidity
and price efficiency are inßuenced by strategic interaction between agents with dif-
ferent types of private information. Allowing the supply informed agent to behave
strategically, has an important role in the market-making and in information revela-
tion. Indeed, he decreases the market depth and increases the amount of information
revealed in prices but, unlike in the perfect competitive case, he also makes positive
proÞts. Our model suggests that the presence of different types of information in the
market decreases market liquidity. The result is in line with the one of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) that more information in the market leads to an increase in the bid-
ask spread (i.e. a decrease in the market liquidity). The result should be situated in
between the one of Kyle (1985, 1989) and the subsequent literature which shows that
increasing the number of informed traders increases market liquidity, and the one of
Subrahmanyam (1991) which shows the opposite. Thus, Subrahmanyam (1991) also
obtains that market liquidity can be decreased by increasing the number of informed
traders in the case traders are risk averse. In our model we obtain that the presence
of the supply informed agent and therefore, of a different type of information in the
market, leads to a decrease in market liquidity. Still, if we are increasing the number
of price informed traders we will still obtain the increase the market liquidity obtained
in Kyle (1985, 1989).
We performed comparative statics results for market liquidity measured as market
depth and we conclude that if the information received by the supply informed agent
is very precise or the one of the price informed agents is very poor the market liquidity
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is low. Most important, the presence of a supply informed agent in the market induces
non-monotonicity of the market depth and other market performance indicators. Fi-
nally, we study how changes in supply affect the equilibrium price. We will consider
two cases: a change in supply known to all investors or a change known only to the
supply informed investors. We obtain that price informed agents absorb a higher frac-
tion of the known shock, while the supply informed agent absorbs always half of the
unknown shock.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
We establish the information structure and deÞne the imperfect competitive rational
equilibrium expectations. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. We Þnd an unique
linear imperfect competitive rational expectations price function together with agents
demand functions in equilibrium. Section 4 proceeds with the calculation of some
market indicators: volatility of prices, informativeness of prices and expected proÞts.
Section 5 contains the characterization the equilibrium in the case there is no supply
informed trader and then Section 6 compares the market indicators of this economy
with the one of the economy with a supply informed agent. Finally, Section 7 summa-
rizes the results and gives some directions for further research. All the proofs appear
in the appendix.
2 The Model
The framework is similar to the one in Kyle (1989). However, we assume risk neutrality,
absence of uniformed traders and random supply with an observable component for
one trader - the supply informed trader. As already pointed out by Kyle (1989), the
assumption of existence of uninformed traders does not change the analysis, but their
presence leads to an increase in market depth. In what it follows we make the following
assumptions:
A.1 There is a single security in the market that trades at market clearing price ep
and yields an exogenous liquidation value ev which has a normal distribution with mean
v and variance σ2v.
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A.2 There areN price informed traders, indexed n = 1, ..., N and a supply informed
trader. The price informed trader n observes a private signal ein = ev + een. We assume
that en is distributed N(0,σ2e) for all n = 1, ..., N. We suppose that for any j 6= n ej
and een are uncorrelated and moreover, they are uncorrelated with all the other random
variables in the model. The supply informed trader observes a private signal S which
is normal distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2S > 0.
A.3 The random supply that keeps the traders from perfectly inferring the aggre-
gate information from prices is modelled in a similar manner to the one in Gennotte
and Leland (1990). The net supply em consists of a Þxed amount m and a random
supply eS distributed N (0,σ2S) . This liquidity shock eS is observed only by the supply
informed trader.
A.4 Agents are risk neutral and behave strategically taking into account the effect
of their trading on prices.
As in Kyle (1989), the nth price informed trader has a strategy Xn which is a
mapping from R2 (the cartesian product of the set of asset prices and the set of his
signals) to R (the set of shares he desires to trade), Xn(·, ·) : R2 −→ R. After observing
his signal in, each price informed trader submits a demand schedule (or generalized
limit order) Xn
³
·,ein´ , which depends upon his signal. Similarly, the supply informed
trader has a strategy Y which is a mapping from R2 (the cartesian product of the set
of asset prices and the set of his signals) to R (the set of shares he wants to trade),
Y (·, ·) : R2 −→ R. After observing the signal S, the supply informed trader chooses
a demand schedule Y (·, S), which depends upon that signal. Notice that since m is
known by everyone, this implies that the supply informed agent actually knows em.
Given a market clearing price p, the quantities traded by price informed traders and
supply informed trader can be written xn = Xn(p, in), n = 1, ..., N and y = Y (p, S). In
the above notations a tilde distinguishes a random variable from its realization. Thus,
xn denotes a particular realization of exn. The assumption that the price informed and
the supply informed agents submit limit orders for execution against existing limit
orders submitted by the other market participants turns out to be very important (for
a detailed discussion see Kyle (1989)). In this context both the price informed and the
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supply informed agents provide liquidity and therefore, have a market making role in
the market.
The price of the asset is set such that the market clears. The traders submit
their demand schedules to an auctioneer who aggregates all the schedules submitted,
calculates the market clearing price and allocates quantities to satisfy traders demand.
Thus, the market clearing price ep should satisfy with probability one
NX
n=1
Xn
³ep,ein´+ Y ³ep, eS´ = em. (1)
To emphasize the dependence of the market-clearing price on the strategies of the
traders we write
p = p(X,Y ), xn = xn(X,Y ), y = y(X,Y ),
whereX is the vector of strategies of price informed traders deÞned byX = (X1, ..., XN)
and Y is the strategy of the supply informed trader.
The traders are risk neutral and maximize expected proÞts. The proÞts of the price
informed trader n and supply informed trader are, respectively, given by
eπPIn = (ev − ep(X,Y )) exn(X,Y ), eπSI = (ev − ep(X,Y )) ey(X,Y ).
With these notations, following Kyle (1989) we can proceed to deÞne a rational
expectations equilibrium in our setup.
Definition 1 An imperfectly competitive rational expectations equilibrium is deÞned
as a vector (X,Y, p), where X is a vector of strategies of the price informed agents
X = (X1, ...,XN), Y is a strategy of the supply informed agent and p is the equilibrium
price such that the following conditions hold:
1. For all n = 1, ..., N and for any alternative strategy vector X 0 differing from X
only in the nth component Xn, the strategy X yields a higher proÞt than X 0:
En
h
(ev − ep(X,Y ))exn(X,Y )| ep(X,Y ) = p, ein = ii ≥
En
h
(ev − ep(X 0, Y ))exn(X 0, Y )| ep(X 0, Y ) = p, ein = ii .
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2. For any alternative strategy Y 0 the strategy Y yields a higher proÞt than Y 0 :
E
h
(ev − ep(X,Y ))ey(X,Y )| ep(X,Y ) = p, eS = Si ≥
E
h
(ev − ep(X 0, Y ))ey(X,Y 0)| ep(X,Y 0) = p, eS = Si .
3. The price p = ep(X,Y ) clears the market (with probability one) i.e.
NX
n=1
Xn
³ep,ein´+ Y ³ep, eS´ = em.
This deÞnes a Nash equilibrium in demand functions. Given their private informa-
tion, traders maximize their conditional expected proÞts taking into account the effect
of their trading on prices and taking as given the strategies other traders use to choose
their demand schedules.
We look for a symmetric linear Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as in Kyle (1989), that
is, an equilibrium where the strategies Xn and Y are linear functions:
Xn
³ep,ein´ = αPI + βPIein − γPIep, for any n = 1, ..., N and
Y
³ep, eS´ = αSI + βSI eS − γSIep, (2)
where αPI ,βPI , γPI ,αSI ,βSI , γSI ∈ R.
With this assumption we can infer from the market clearing condition that the
equilibrium price is given by
p =
¡
NγPI + γSI
¢−1Ã
NαPI + αSI + βPI
X
n=1
ein + βSI eS − em! . (3)
3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
We describe in the following proposition the equations that characterize the symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium has linear trading rules and linear pricing
rule and is shown to be unique among all linear, symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
As in most Kyle type models, the linearities are not ex-ante imposed in the agents
strategy sets: as long as the informed traders use a linear trading strategy, the market
maker will use a linear pricing rule and vice versa.
9
Proposition 1 If N(N − 2) ≥ σ
2
e
σ2v
there exists a unique linear symmetric equilibrium
deÞned as:
Xn
³ep,ein´ = αPI + βPIein − γPIep, for any n = 1, ..., N and
Y
³ep, eS´ = αSI + βSI eS − γSIep,
with αPI ,βPI , γPI , αSI , βSI , γSI given by
αPI =
σ2e (N (3N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σv (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
v +
N (N − 2)σ2v − σ2e
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
βPI =
δ1/2
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPI =
(N2σv + (2N − 1) σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
αSI = −(N − 1) (N
2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e)σ2eδ1/2
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e) (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
v +
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
βSI =
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γSI = −(N − 1)σ
2
e (N
2σ2v + (2N − 1) σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e) (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
,
(4)
where
δ ≡ (N(N − 2)σ
2
v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e)σ2S
(N − 1)σ2e
.
The condition N(N − 2) ≥ σ
2
e
σ2v
is similar to the usual condition N > 2 in all Kyle-
type models. It tells us that we need competition in order to alleviate the asymmetric
information problem. In our model the asymmetric information problem is even more
important than in Kyle (1985, 1989) because we have two different types of information
that aggregates in prices. Since the supply informed agent observes the supply he
acts as an informational monopolist trading such that he always extracts some rents.
However, the price informed agents are competing against him trying to reduce his
informational advantage. The worse the quality of the signal of the price informed
traders relative to the liquidation value, the more difficult is for them to compete against
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the supply informed. However, since they are asymmetrically informed, increasing their
number it will make it more difficult for the supply informed to infer their information.
Consequently, in the case we have a supply informed agent we need more competition
in order to reduce his monopoly power and trade aggressiveness and therefore, for the
equilibrium to exists.
We would like to understand the effects of different types of information on market
liquidity, informativeness of prices, price volatility, and the ability of informed traders
to exploit their private information. We are Þrst concerned with market liquidity
because it has been recognized as an important determinant of market behaviour.
There are different measures of market liquidity used in the literature: market depth,
bid-ask spread and price movement after trade. We will use as a measure of liquidity
the market depth (as deÞned by Kyle (1989)), which represents the volume of trading
needed to move prices one unit. While solving the above system we have obtained that
γ = NγPI + γSI =
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
.
On the other hand, from the price equation (3) we can see that an increase (decrease)
in the supply by γ induces the price to fall (rise) by one dollar. The trading volume
needed to move the price by one unit (market depth) was used by Kyle (1985) as a
measure of market liquidity. We use the same measure as Kyle and consequently, γ
is our measure of the market liquidity. As we can see the market depth γ has two
components that have opposite effect. The Þrst component NγPI is attributed to the
price informed agents trading. This is the amount with which they contribute to a
change in the price when each of them trades an additional unit. The more priced
informed agents are in the market, the higher the liquidity. Similarly, we have that
γSI is the change in price due to an additional unit of trading by the supply informed
agent. The two components have opposite sign and we have here a trade-off: whenever
the price informed agents are increasing the market liquidity the supply informed agent
will try to reduce it.
The fact that γSI is negative is a very important result in our model and it is a
consequence of the mechanism of information transmission through prices. In general,
with asymmetric information prices play a dual role of information aggregation and
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market clearing. The role of information aggregation played by prices is even more
important in our economy with asymmetric and different information. We have thus,
two important channels through which we have ßow of information (information about
the liquidation value from the price informed traders towards the supply informed
trader and information about supply from the supply informed trader towards the
price informed traders). The supply informed agent puts a positive weight on price
(γSI < 0) because when he sees an increase in price he associates it with good news
about the liquidation value (he knows the supply, so the price increase cannot be due to
a decrease in supply). This mechanism of information transmission actually triggers a
decrease in market liquidity. For 1 additional unit demanded by a price informed agent
the price goes up. The supply informed agent associates it with good news about the
liquidation value and increases his demand leading to a even higher increase in price.
Since the same volume will increase the price more we can conclude that we have a
decrease in the market liquidity.
Next, let us investigate how the market depth varies with the parameters of the
model: the variance of the liquidity shock σ2S, the variance of signals σ
2
e, and the
variance of the liquidation value σ2v.
Corollary 1 (i) Market depth is increasing in the variance of liquidity shock eS, σ2S.
(ii) Market depth is decreasing in the variance of the error of the signal received by
price informed agents σ2e.
(iii) Market depth viewed as a function of the variance of liquidation value σ2v has
an inverted U-shaped.
(iv) Market depth is decreasing in the relative quality of the signals
σ2e
σ2v
.
As we have seen before, the market depth has two components γ = NγPI + γSI .
The Þrst component is the contribution to the market depth of trades executed by
price informed agents while the second one is the contribution to the market depth
of trades executed by the supply informed agent. The two components have opposite
effect and thus, the Þnal result on market depth due to the market making activity
of the agents depends on which of the two components dominates. The Þrst result
in the Corollary is similar to the previous ones in the literature (Kyle (1985) and the
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other imperfect competition models). It tells us that the higher the variance of the
supply (in the other papers -the variance of the noise trading), the easier is for the price
informed agents to hide and therefore, to make use of their informational advantage
(the volume needed to move the price is higher, and this helps them to trade better on
their information without being discovered). If the signal of the supply informed agent
is very informative he reduces the market liquidity. Otherwise, he might infer wrongly
the information embedded in prices and therefore, contribute himself to the increase in
the market liquidity. The second result claims that if the signal of the price informed
agents is very precise, the market depth is high. This happens because when the price
informed agents have poor informational advantage, they trade less aggressively and
devote more to market making activities. Notice that these results indicate that the
effect on market depth of the trades of price informed agents dominates the effect of
the trades of the supply informed agent for all values of σ2S or σ
2
e. The third result is
somehow different from the previous results. This difference is triggered exactly by the
existence of a supply informed agent. Here we have that the effect on market depth of
the trades of supply informed agent may dominate the effect of the trades of the price
informed agents when the variance of liquidation value is high. If the variance σ2v is
small, the signal the price informed receive is better and the supply informed agent is
not able to decrease the market liquidity. However, as the variance of liquidation value
σ2v increases, we have more competition in the market and therefore a decrease in the
market depth. Finally, we see that the effect of changing σ2e always dominates the one
of σ2v, the market liquidity being always decreasing in
σ2e
σ2v
.
We do obtain in our model that the behaviour of the market depth with respect
to the variance of the supply and the variance of the error of the signal is very similar
to the previous cases in the literature, but overall the quantitative result it is very
different. We obtain that the presence of a supply informed decreases the market
liquidity. Our result should be interpreted as it follows: if we have different types of
information in the market, the liquidity is reduced. The result should be situated in
between the one of Kyle (1985, 1989) and the subsequent literature which show that
increasing the number of informed traders increases market liquidity, and the one of
Subrahmanyam (1991) which shows the opposite. Thus, Subrahmanyam (1991) also
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obtains that market liquidity can be decreased by increasing the number of informed
traders in the case the market maker is risk averse. In our model we obtain that the
presence of the supply informed agent and therefore, of a different type of information,
leads to a decrease in market liquidity. This result captures the intuition of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), that more information in the market decreases the market liquidity.
In their model, they use as a measure of liquidity the bid-ask spread (low liquidity
being equivalent to high bid-ask spread), and an increase in the number of informed
agents increases the bid-ask spread. Still, if we are increasing the number of price
informed traders we will have again the increase the market liquidity obtained in Kyle
(1985, 1989). Despite of the fact that the decrease in the market liquidity is due to the
different type of information, our result is very similar to the one of Subrahmanyam
(1991). The similitude is caused by the fact that the supply informed agent is risk
neutral, but he behaves strategically. Moreover, since he submits limit orders he has a
market-making role, the role played by him in the economy being thus similar to the
one played by the risk-averse market maker in Subrahmanyams (1991) model.
Once we have determined the equilibrium demand strategies we can determine also
the market clearing price.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium price is given by
ep = σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
v +
Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
ein
− Nσ
2
v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS − 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m (5)
From this corollary we can see that the unconditional expectation of the equilibrium
price is
E (ep) = v − 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m
and it depends on the expected supply m. If m = 0, the price is an unbiased estimator
of v, but it is biased if m 6= 0. We also can see that as expected the higher the supply
(the expected supply m, or the realization of the liquidity shock eS observed by the
supply informed agent), the lower the price and the higher the signals received by the
price informed agents the higher the price.
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Notice also that a change in the different components of the supply has a different
impact on price. A change in the known part of supply m is absorbed by the agents
through the quantity demanded in a proportion of
N − 1
N
(we have seen while calculat-
ing the strategies that α = NαPI +αSI = g(N,σ2v,σ
2
e)+
(N − 1)
N
m, where g(N,σ2v,σ
2
e)
is the function we had obtained in the Appendix) and only
1
N
is reßected in price.
Similarly, a shock in the component of supply known to supply informed agent eS is
absorbed half by this agent through his demand and partly is reßected in price. As
I have already explained, the supply informed trader has a monopolist position and
extracts rents that amount, as we saw above, to half of the unknown component of
supply.
4 Market Indicators
In what it follows we study the implications the existence of a supply informed agent
have on the market performance. We compute some market indicators: volatility of
prices, informativeness of prices and expected proÞts of different market participants
and characterize them with respect to the variance of the liquidation value of the asset.
Corollary 3 The price volatility, measured as the variance of price, is
V ar (ep) = N2 (N − 2) (σ2v)2 +Nσ2vσ2e (2N2 − 3N − 1)− (σ2e)2
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
µ
Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
¶2
Similar to the case when there exists no supply informed agent we have that the
volatility of prices does not depend on the noise in supply. If the noise in supply
increases all the agents - both the price informed and the supply informed - trade more
aggressively making better use of their particular informational advantage. We can also
see that price volatility may decrease or increase with the variance of the liquidation
value σ2v. We obtain thus that the price volatility has a U shape as respect to σ
2
v.
When the variance of the liquidation value σ2v is small there is not too much information
revealed. But as we have seen if σ2v increases, the market depth decreases and this leads
to more information revelation. Consequently, when σ2v increases the prices become
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more volatile just because they contain more information. It is interesting to notice that
if the competition increases the range in which the volatility of prices is a decreasing
function of σ2v shrinks and we recover the result from the case without supply informed
trader that the higher the variance of the liquidation value of the asset, the higher the
volatility of prices. As a result, in a market where there are enough price informed
agents, there is more information revelation and the volatility of prices increases.
Next, we would like to Þnd which is the amount of private information - both about
the liquidation value and supply - that is revealed through prices. We deÞne thus, the
information content of prices as the difference between the prior variance of the payoff
and the variance conditional on prices. Using the normality assumptions we obtain the
expression presented in the following Corollary:
Corollary 4 The information content of prices is
V ar (ev)− V ar (ev| ep) = Nσ2v (N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
N2 (N − 2) (σ2v)2 +Nσ2vσ2e (2N2 − 3N − 1)− (σ2e)2
.
Similarly to the previous Corollary, we obtain here also that price efficiency or
the information content of prices does not depend on the variance of supply shockeS. Moreover, we obtain that informativenes of prices is increasing the variance of the
liquidation value σ2v and decreasing in the variance σ
2
e. These results tells us that when
it is difficult to predict the liquidation value or when the signals of price informed
agents are poor, the prices play a very important role in information revelation. While
these results, are qualitatively similar to the case without supply informed agent, as
we will see later they are quantitatively different.
Let us turn to the expected volume traded by the price informed agent and supply
informed agent, respectively.
Corollary 5 The expected volume traded by a price informed agent is
E (|xn|) = 2 (N − 1)σ
2
vm
N2σ2v + σ
2
e
+
¡
2
π
¢1/2
4N2
Ã
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
2
+N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
2
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
2 (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
2
¡
σ2v + σ
2
e
¢
δ + σ2S
!
.
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The expected volume traded by the supply informed trader is
E (|y|) = 2 (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)m
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
+
µ
1
8π
¶1/2
σ2S
µ
1 +
(N − 1)σ2e (N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (σ2v + σ2e)
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
2
¶
.
The expected volume traded by price informed agents and supply informed agent
depend positively on the expected supply m and the variance of the supply shock σ2S.
However, both the effects of an increase in σ2S and inm are stronger in the case of supply
informed trader. This is the role we wanted actually the supply informed agent to have.
Since he has information about supply he captures a big part of the shocks. Finally,
the comparative statics with respect to the variance of the liquidation value σ2v and the
one of the error σ2e are ambiguous. In the case without supply informed we have that
the expected volume traded by the informed agents increases when the the variance
of liquidation value σ2v increases and the variance the error σ
2
e decreases. Actually,
when the ratio of the variance of the error to the variance of the liquidation value σ2v
increases (so the quality of his signal decreases) the expected volume traded increases
because the agent has not good informational advantage. However, the presence of a
supply informed agent diminishes the informational advantage of the price informed
agents and therefore, they are forced to trade more aggresively on their information.
We compute next the unconditional proÞts for all agents.
Corollary 6 The unconditional expected proÞt of the nth price informed agent is
ΠPIn = E
¡eπPIn ¢ = σ2vδ1/2 (N − 1)σ2e2N (N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) (Nσ2v + σ2e)
µ
N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
−
(N − 1)σ2e
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
¶
+
(N − 1)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
2Nσ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m2.
The unconditional proÞt of the supply informed agent is
ΠSI = E
¡eπSI¢ = δ1/2 (N − 1)σ2eσ2v
2 (N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e)
µ
(N − 1)σ2e
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
+
N
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
¶
+
2Nσ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m2.
As we expected, allowing the supply informed agent to behave strategically allows
him to make positive proÞts by comparison with the case of perfect competition when
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he is making zero proÞts. Notice also that since the price informed traders absorb
always
1
2N
of the shock S, it is actually the different information that they receive the
one that makes them have different proÞts. We want to see also which is the impact of
changes in supply on the equilibrium price and the quantity demanded by the different
agents. Similar to Gennotte and Leland (1990) we study the two following cases: a
supply increase known to all agents m, and a supply increase known only to supply
informed agent eS.
Corollary 7 A positive shock in supply known to all the agents m leads to an increase
in the demand of both type of agents, a decrease in the equilibrium price and therefore,
to an increase in the expected proÞts of both type of agents.
As expected, an increase in the supply known to all agents determines them to
adjust their demands according with the existent supply, and it also leads to a decrease
of the equilibrium price. We obtain here that the price informed agents are always
absorbing a greater proportion of the shock in supply m.
Corollary 8 A positive shock in the component of supply eS, known to the supply in-
formed agent decreases the equilibrium price and increases the quantities demanded by
both price informed and supply informed agents.
As expected, in the case of a positive shock in the supply eS, the supply informed
agent increases his demand making use of the private information he has. Moreover,
the increase in supply (due to a positive shock in eS ) absorbed by the supply informed
agent is N times higher than the increase of supply absorbed by any price informed
agents. An interesting result is that the supply informed agent is always absorbing
half of the unobservable shock in supply, the other half being absorbed by the price
informed agents.
5 Equilibrium without Supply Informed Agent
In order to see which are the effects of different types of information on market liquidity,
informativeness of prices, price volatility, and the ability of informed traders to exploit
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their private information we need to provide a benchmark for making comparison with
the equilibrium characterized in the previous section. A Þrst step will be to see how
the presence in the market of a supply informed agent affects all these market structure
indicators. For that we characterize Þrst, in a similar manner, the equilibrium without
a supply informed agent. Notice that this model is a version of Kyles (1989) model
with the difference that we do not have uniformed agents and we replace the noise
agents by a random supply.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique linear symmetric equilibrium deÞned as:
XI,n
³ep,ein´ = αI + βIein − γIep, for any n = 1, ..., N
where αI ,βI , γI are given by
αI =
2σ2e
Nσ2v
µ
(N − 2)σ2S
N (N − 1)σ2e
¶1/2
v +
(N − 2)
N (N − 1)m
βI =
µ
(N − 2)σ2S
N (N − 1)σ2e
¶1/2
γI =
Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e
Nσ2v
µ
(N − 2)σ2S
N (N − 1)σ2e
¶1/2
.
Similarly to the case with supply informed agent we proceed with the calculations
of the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantities traded by the price informed agent.
Corollary 9 The equilibrium price when there is no supply informed agent is
epI = 2σ2e
Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e
v +
σ2v
Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e
NX
n=1
ein − σ2v
Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e
µ
N (N − 1)σ2e
(N − 2)σ2S
¶ eS
− σ
2
v
(Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e) (N − 1)
µ
N (N − 1)σ2e
(N − 2)σ2S
¶1/2
m.
Notice that the price is here also an unbiased estimator of ev if and only if m = 0.
Next we compute the same market indicators we have computed for the economy with a
supply informed agent. An interesting remark to be made is that neither the volatility
of prices nor the efficiency of prices depend on the shocks in supply.
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Corollary 10 The market indicators for an economy without a supply informed agent
are the following:
1) The price volatility, measured as the variance of price, is
V ar ( epI) = N µ σ2v
Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e
¶2µ
σ2v +
(2N − 3)
(N − 2) σ
2
e
¶
.
2) The information content of prices is
V ar (ev)− V ar (ev| epI) = Nσ2v (N − 2) ¡(N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 3)σ2e¢−1 .
3) The expected volume traded by a price informed agent is
E (|xI,n|) = 1
N
m+
µ
2
π
¶1/2µ
σ2S
((N − 2)σ2v + (N − 1)σ2e)
N2σ2e
¶
.
4) The expected proÞt of a price informed agent is
ΠPII,n = E
¡eπPII,n¢ = E ((ev − epI) exn) = σ2vN (Nσ2v + 2σ2e)
µ
N (N − 1)σ2e
(N − 2) σ2S
¶1/2µ
m2
N − 1 + σ
2
S
¶
.
6 Comparison of Market Indicators
We are comparing now the market indicators in the case there exists a supply informed
agent with the case there is no supply informed agent. We study Þrst the effect the
presence of the supply informed agent brings about on the market depth. We have that
γ ≡ NγPI + γSI = (N
2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e)σe
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)σS
µ
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e)
(N − 1)
¶1/2
the market depth in the case we have a supply informed agent and
γPI ≡ NγI =
(Nσ2v + 2σ
2
e)σS
σ2vσe
µ
(N − 2)
N (N − 1)
¶
the market depth in the case we do not have any supply informed agent. The market
depth is smaller in the case we have a supply informed agent in the market γ < γPI .
This result is quite intuitive if we think that the supply informed agent plays a dual
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role in the market. First, he reveals himself a part of his information in the process
of trading. Second, by having the information about supply he determines the price
informed agents to reveal more of the information they own.
An interesting result that we obtain is that when there exists a supply informed
trader in the market the price informed traders are trading more aggressively on their
private information
¡
βPI > βI
¢
but they devote less to the market making activity
ωPI =
σ2e (N (3N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
< ωI =
2σ2e
Nσ2v
µ
(N − 2)σ2S
N (N − 1)σ2e
¶
.
The inside information allows the price informed agents to make gains on the expense
of the market makers. However, when there exists a supply informed agent who has the
ability to disentangle the order ßow originated by price informed agents from a shock
in supply, the advantage of the price informed agent diminishes and therefore, his
market making gains. A part of the gains that the price informed agents where making
from market maker activity are now made by the supply informed agent. As we have
seen already the price informed agents still put a higher weight on the maker making
activity than the supply informed agent does. This tells us that a dealer although he
might have information about supply faces strong competition in market making from
the other traders. Moreover, we have that the effect of trading more aggressively on
their information dominates the effect of decreasing the market maker activity and this
leads to a higher trading volume by price informed agents.
Proposition 3 The presence of the supply informed agent in the market leads to higher
volatility of prices, higher informativeness of prices and higher volume of trading by
price informed agents.
The results that the volatility and informativeness of prices increase in the case
there exists a supply informed agent is due to two factors. First, the existence in the
market of the information about supply forces informed agents to reveal more of their
information. But also, the shock in supply affects more the price than in the case there
is no supply informed agent because the price informed agents get some information
about supply from the action of the supply informed trader.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model of insider trading where the agents might have
information either about prices or about supply. This information is aggregated and
partially revealed through the equilibrium price, so the agents will end up with more
information than they initially posses. Our goal is twofold. First we try to understand
how the presence in the market of a supply informed agent and the interaction with
the price informed agents can change the behaviour of the price informed agents and
the structure of the market. Then, we see how the shocks in different components of
supply can alter the market structure, the price formation and the behaviour of the
agents, and therefore the impact of this shocks in the equilibrium outcome.
We consider an imperfectly competitive rational expectations setup and characterize
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in demand schedules. We characterize in closed form
the symmetric linear equilibrium for the case the errors of the signals of the price
informed agents are noncorrelated. Allowing the supply informed agent to behave
strategically, he makes positive proÞts (unlike in the perfect competitive case) and
increases the amount of information revealed in prices. We see that he has a dual role
in inducing information transmission in the market: Þrst because he owns superior
information which he reveals in the trading process and second, because he urges the
price informed agent to reveal more of their information. Hower, the most important
consequence of his presence in the market is that he decreases market liquidity ( this
outcome being brought about the strategic behavior and the mechanism of information
transmission through prices).
We have also studied how the market performance is affected in our model by
the quality of information received by the agents. The comparative statics results
about market liquidity measured as market depth tell us that it is decreasing in the
variance of the error of the signal received by price informed agents, increasing in the
variance of the supply shock known only by the supply informed agent and has an
inverted U shape as respect to the variance of the liquidation value. Comparing the
market indicators in our model with the ones in the benchmark case (where there is no
supply informed agent) we conclude that the supply informed agent does indeed have
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an important effect. We Þnd that the market depth decreases, while the volatility of
prices, informativeness of prices and intensity of trading of price informed agents all
increase.
We have considered also the case when the supply informed agent has information
only about a component of supply. This setup is similar to the one in Gennotte
and Leland (1990), where the supply has three components: a component known by
everyone, a component known by the supply informed agent and another one known
by nobody. The numerical analysis we have performed for this case suggests a similar
pattern. However, in this case the supply informed agent will not put always a positive
weight on price. Since he cannot anymore disentangle perfectly the two factors that
might affect the prices (the news about the liquidation value of the asset revealed by
the price informed agents or a shock in the unknown component of supply), he will not
have anymore the same effect on market liquidity. However, for relative high variance
of the known component in supply relative to the unknown component,
σS
σL
the result
we have obtained here will still hold.
Finally, we would like to extend our work in modelling the process of information
aquisition in a similar way to Froot et al. (1992). They develop a model à la Kyle
(1985) were the informed traders have the possibility to acquire information about two
different components of the liquidation value of the asset and show that the traders
may herd on the same information trying to learn what other traders also know.
A Appendix
Lemma A.1 In a symmetric linear equilibrium NγPI + γSI 6= 0.
Proof. We look for a symmetric linear equilibrium. Therefore, we use the linear
strategies deÞned in (2) and we can write the market clearing condition (1) as it
follows:
NαPI + βPI
NX
n=1
ein −NγPIep+ αSI + βSI eS − γSIep = m+ eS. (6)
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We deÞne γ ≡ NγPI + γSI and α ≡ NαPI + αSI . Using these deÞnitions, the market
clearing condition can be written as
α+ βPI
NX
n=1
ein − γep− (1− βSI)eS = m.
We want to prove that γ 6= 0. Let us suppose that γ = 0. Then, the above condition
becomes
α+ βPI
NX
n=1
ein − (1− βSI)eS = m.
Since ein, n = 1, ..., N are independent of eS, it results that βPI = 0. Plugging it in the
above equation we obtain that
α− (1− βSI)eS = m,
which cannot be satisÞed because α andm are real numbers and eS is a random variable.
We obtained therefore, a contradiction.
Lemma A.2 In a symmetric linear equilibrium the optimal demand for the price in-
formed trader n and for the supply informed trader are, respectively,
xn
³ep, ein´ = ¡(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ hE ³ev ¯¯¯ep, ein´− epi (7)
y(ep, eS) = NγPI hE ³ev ¯¯¯ep, eS´− epi (8)
with γPI > 0, and (N − 1)γPI + γSI > 0.
Proof. Let us Þrst determine the optimal demand for the price informed traders. Price
informed trader n considers the other players strategies as given by (2). As a result,
he is facing the following residual demand:
p =
α− αPI + βPI P
j 6=n
eij − (1− βSI)eS −m
(N − 1)γPI + γSI +
xn
(N − 1)γPI + γSI (9)
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and he solves the following maximization problem:
max
xn∈R
E
³
(ev − ep)xn ¯¯¯ep, ein´⇔
max
xn∈R
E

ev − α− α
PI + βPI
P
j 6=n
eij − (1− βSI)eS −m− xn
(N − 1)γPI + γSI
xn
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ep, ein
 .
The Þrst order condition for this problem is
E
³ev|ep, ein´−E
 α− α
PI + βPI
P
j 6=n
eij − (1− βSI)eS −m
(N − 1)γPI + γSI
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ep, ein

− 2xn
(N − 1)γPI + γSI = 0. (10)
Using (9) we can write further (10) as
E
³ev ¯¯¯ep, ein´− p− xn
(N − 1)γPI + γSI = 0,
and from here we Þnd the optimal demand of price informed trader n :
xn = ((N − 1)γPI + γSI)
³
E
³ev ¯¯¯ep, ein´− p´ .
The second order sufficient condition for this maximization problem is
− 2
(N − 1)γPI + γSI < 0⇔ (N − 1)γ
PI + γSI > 0.
Similarly, the supply informed trader takes as given the strategies of the price
informed traders and in conformity with (2). The residual demand faced by him is
therefore
p =
NαPI +NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een −m− eS
NγPI
+
y
NγPI
. (11)
The supply informed trader solves the following maximization problem:
max
y∈R
E
³
(ev − ep) y ¯¯¯ep, eS´⇔
max
y∈R
E

ev − Nα
PI +NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een −m− eS
NγPI
+
y
NγPI
 y
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ ep, eS
 .
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The Þrst order condition for this problem is
E
³ev|ep, eS´−E
Nα
PI +NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
ej −m− eS − eL
NγPI
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ ep, eS
− 2yNγPI = 0.
(12)
Using (11) we can write further (12) as
E
³ev ¯¯¯ep, eS´− p− y
NγPI
= 0,
and from here we Þnd the optimal demand of supply informed trader
y = NγPI
³
E
³ev ¯¯¯ep, eS´− p´ .
The second order sufficient condition for this maximization problem is
− 2
NγPI
< 0⇔ NγPI > 0.
Since N ≥ 1 it results γPI > 0.
Lemma A.3 In a symmetric linear equilibrium for any n = 1, ..., N we have
E
³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, ein = in´ = v ¡1−A (N − 1)βPI −B¢−A(α−m)
+(B −AβPI)ein +Aγep.
Proof. We can rewrite the market clearing condition (6) as
epγ − α+m− βPI ein = (N − 1)βPIev + βPIX
j 6=n
ej − (1− βSI)eS. (13)
From here it results that
³ep, ein´ is informationally equivalent to ³fhn, ein´ where by
deÞnition fhn ≡ (N − 1)βPIev + βPI P
j 6=n
ej − (1− βSI)eS. Consequently, we have
E
³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, ein = in´ = E ³ev ¯¯¯fhn = hn, ein = in´ . Applying the projection theorem for
normally distributed random variables we obtain that
E
³ev ¯¯¯fhn = hn, ein = in´ = v + ³ A B ´
 fhn −E ³fhn´ein −E ³ein´
 , (14)
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where
³
A B
´
= cov
³ev,³fhn, ein´´³var ³fhn, ein´´−1 , when ³var ³fhn, ein´´−1 exists.
We compute cov
³ev,fhn´ = covÃev, (N − 1)βPIev + βPI P
j 6=n
eξj − (1− βSI)eS
!
=
(N − 1)βPIσ2v. Hence, we have that cov
³ev,³fhn, ein´´ = ³cov ³ev,fhn´ , cov(³ev, ein´)´ =¡
(N − 1)βPIσ2v, σ2v
¢
. Then we calculate the variance matrix. We calculate Þrstly
var
³fhn´ = varÃ(N − 1)βPIev + βPIX
j 6=n
ej − (1− βSI)eS! =
= (βPI)2(N − 1) ¡(N − 1)σ2v + σ2e¢+ (1− βSI)2σ2S.
In order to simplify the notation we deÞne q ≡ (N − 1) ((N − 1)σ2v + σ2e) . Next we see
that cov
³fhn, ein´ = (N − 1)βPIσ2v and consequently, we can write the variance matrix
as
var
³³fhn, ein´´ =
 (βPI)2q + (1− βSI)2σ2S (N − 1)βPIσ2v
(N − 1)βPIσ2v σ2v + σ2e
 .
The determinant of the variance matrix is
M = (βPI)2 (N − 1) ¡Nσ2v + σ2e¢σ2e + (1− βSI)2σ2S ¡σ2v + σ2e¢ .
and this is always higher than zero.
Since M 6= 0, it exists the inverse of the variance matrix and it equals to
³
var
³fhn, ein´´−1 = 1
M
 σ2v + σ2e −(N − 1)βPIσ2v
−(N − 1)βPIσ2e (βPI)2q + (1− βSI)2σ2S
 .
Once we have calculated cov
³ev,³fhn, ein´´ and ³var ³fhn, ein´´−1 we can proceed
and identify A and B. It results that
A =M−1(N − 1)βPIσ2vσ2e and
B =M−1
h
(βPI)2 (N − 1)σ2vσ2e +
¡
1− βSI¢2 σ2Sσ2vi . (15)
Sincefhn ≡ (N − 1)βPIev+βPI P
j 6=n
ej− (1−βSI)eS we have E ³fhn´ = (N − 1)βPIv.
In addition, we assumed that E
³ein´ = E (ev + een) = v. Using the above values for
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expectations and the formula (13) for fhn the expression (14) can be written as
E
³ev ¯¯¯fhn = hn, ein = in´ = v +A³fhn − (N − 1)βPIv´+B ³ein − v´
= v
¡
1−A (N − 1)βPI −B¢−A(α−m) + (B −AβPI)ein +Aγep, (16)
where A and B are given by (15).
Lemma A.4 In a symmetric linear equilibrium we have
E(ev|ep = p, eS = S) = v ¡1− CNβPI¢− C(α−m) + (1− βSI)C eS + Cγep.
Proof. We write again the market clearing condition (6) this time in order to Þnd a
pair informationally equivalent to
³ep, eS´
epγ − α+m+ (1− βSI)eS = βPI NX
n=1
ein. (17)
We deÞne θ ≡ βPI
NP
n=1
ein. From here it results that ³eθ, eS´ is informationally equivalent
to
³ep, eS´ . Consequently, E ³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, eS = S´ = E ³ev ¯¯¯eθ = θ, eS = S´ . Applying again
the projection theorem for normally distributed random variables we obtain that
E
³ev ¯¯¯eθ = θ, eS = S´ = v + ³ C, D ´
 eθ −E ³eθ´eS −E ³eS´
 , (18)
where
³
C, D
´
= cov
³ev,³eθ, eS´´³var ³eθ, eS´´−1 .
Let us calculate cov
³ev,³eθ, eS´´ . First we compute the covariance of ev and eθ
cov
³ev,eθ´ = covµev, NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een¶ = NβPIσ2v. Since ev and eS are indepen-
dent random variables, it results that cov
³ev,³eθ, eS´´ = ³ NβPIσ2v, 0 ´ . Sim-
ilarly we calculate the variance-covariance matrix. First, we calculate cov
³eθ,eθ´ =
cov
µ
NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een, NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een¶ = (βPI)2N (Nσ2v + σ2e) . Then notice
that cov
³eθ, eS´ = covµNβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een, eS¶ = 0. It results that
var
³eθ, eS´ =
 (βPI)2N (Nσ2v + σ2e) 0
0 σ2S
 .
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The variance matrix is nonsingular and its inverse is
³
var
³eθ, eS´´−1 =
 ((βPI)2N (Nσ2v + σ2e))−1 0
0 (σ2S)
−1
 ,
and consequently,
C = σ2v
¡
βPI
¡
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¢¢−1
and D = 0. (19)
Since E
³ein´ = v, and eθ ≡ NβPIev + βPI NP
n=1
een we have that E ³eθ´ = NβPIv. In
addition, we assumed that E
³eS´ = 0. Using the above values for expectations, the
fact that D = 0 and the formula (17) for eθ, the expression (14) can be written as
E
³ev ¯¯¯eθ = θ, eS = S´ = v + C ³eθ −NβPIv´+DeS
= v
¡
1− CNβPI¢− C(α−m) + (1− βSI)C eS + Cγep, (20)
where C is given by formula (19).
Lemma A.5 The coefficients αPI ,βPI , γPI ,αSI , βSI , γSI are the solution of the fol-
lowing system of equations:

αPI =
¡
(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ (v ¡1−A (N − 1) βPI −B¢−A(α−m))
βPI =
¡
(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ (B −AβPI)
γPI =
¡
(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ (1−Aγ)
αSI = NγPI(v
¡
1− CNβPI¢− C(α−m))
βSI = NγPI(
¡
1− βSI¢C
γSI = NγPI (1− Cγ)
M =
¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + (1− βSI)2σ2S (σ2v + σ2e)
A =M−1(N − 1)βPIσ2vσ2e
B =M−1
³¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1)σ2vσ2e + (1− βSI)2σ2Sσ2v
´
C = σ2v
¡
βPI(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
¢−1
.
Proof of Lemma A.5. In Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4 for we have established
the expressions for E
³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, ein = in´ and E ³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, eS = S´ . We will use them
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now to Þnd the expressions for the strategies for the price informed agents and for the
supply informed agent.
First, since E
³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, ein = in´ = E ³ev ¯¯¯fhn = hn, ein = in´ we plug (16) in (7) and
we obtain that
xn
³ep, ein´ = ((N − 1)γPI + γSI) ¡v ¡1−A (N − 1)βPI −B¢−A(α−m)
+(B −AβPI)ein + (Aγ − 1)ep´ .
We identify the coefficients in the deÞnition of the strategy of the price informed trader
n (2) and we get the following equations:
αPI = ((N − 1)γPI + γSI)(v ¡1−A (N − 1) βPI −B¢−A(α−m))
βPI = ((N − 1)γPI + γSI)(B −AβPI)
γPI = ((N − 1)γPI + γSI)(1−Aγ), (21)
where A and B are given by (15).
Second, since E
³ev ¯¯¯ep = p, eS = S´ = E ³ev ¯¯¯eθ = θ, eS = S´ we plug (20) in (8) and
we obtain in a similar manner
y
³ep, eS´ = NγPI ³v − C(α−m) + (1− βSI)C eS + (Cγ − 1)ep´ .
We identify the coefficients in the deÞnition of the strategy of the supply informed
trader (2) and we get the following equations:
αSI = NγPI(v
¡
1− CNβPI¢− C(α−m))
βSI = NγPI(1− βSI)C
γSI = NγPI(1− Cγ), (22)
where C is given by (19).
Putting together the equations (15), (21), (19) and (22) we obtain that αPI , βPI ,
γPI ,αSI ,βSI , γSI are the solution of the above system of equations.
Proof of Proposition 1. We leave apart the equations for αPI and αSI since
these variables are not involved in the other equations. Then since by deÞnition γ =
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NγPI + γSI we can write the equation
βPI =
¡
(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ ¡B −AβPI¢
as
βPI =
¡
γ − γPI¢ ¡B −AβPI¢
and from here to solve for βPI
βPI =
¡
γ − γPI¢B
1 +A (γ − γPI) . (23)
Similarly, we have that
γPI =
¡
(N − 1) γPI + γSI¢ (1−Aγ) = ¡γ − γPI¢ (1−Aγ)
and we obtain from here that
γPI =
γ (1−Aγ)
2−Aγ . (24)
By substituting γPI given by (24) in (23) we can write further βPI only as a function
of γ and A,
βPI =
µ
γ − γ (1−Aγ)
2−Aγ
¶
B
1 +A
µ
γ − γ (1−Aγ)
2−Aγ
¶ = Bγ
2
. (25)
We obtain the coefficients for the supply informed agent in a similar way. We have
that
βSI = NγPI(1− βSI)C
and from here it results that
βSI =
NγPIC
1 +NγPIC
. (26)
Finally, using the formula (24) we obtain that
γSI = NγPI(1− Cγ) = Nγ (1−Aγ) (1− Cγ)
(2−Aγ) . (27)
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By deÞnition γ = NγPI + γSI . Then by replacing the formulas for γPI and γSI
obtained before we obtain the following equation in A,C and γ :
2−Aγ
1−Aγ = N (2− Cγ) .
In this equation we replace γ =
2βPI
B
and we obtain further
B −AβPI
B − 2AβPI = N
µ
1− 1
B
σ2v
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¶
. (28)
Using the same equation we can rewrite βSI given by (26) in a simpler way.
βSI =
NγPIC
1 +NγPIC
=
NC
γ (1−Aγ)
2−Aγ
1 +NC
γ (1−Aγ)
2−Aγ
=
C
γ
2− Cγ
1 + C
γ
2− Cγ
=
Cγ
2
. (29)
Next, we deÞne z ≡ ¡1− βSI¢2 σ2S. Using (25), (29) and the equation in the system
that deÞnes C we can write
z =
µ
2− Cγ
2
¶2
σ2S =
µ
1− Cβ
PI
B
¶2
σ2S =
µ
1− 1
B
σ2v
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¶2
σ2S.
Further on we compute the expressions for A,B as function only of βPI and z. Thus
A =
(N − 1)βPIσ2vσ2e¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + z (σ2v + σ2e)
By replacing it in the equation (28) we obtain
B
³¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + z (σ2v + σ2e)
´
− (N − 1) ¡βPI¢2 σ2vσ2e
B
³¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e) σ2e + z (σ2v + σ2e)
´
− 2(N − 1) ¡βPI¢2 σ2vσ2e
= N
µ
1− 1
B
σ2v
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¶
.
Let us deÞne now as u ≡ ¡βPI¢2 and x = µ1− 1
B
σ2v
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¶
. Then it results that
z = x2σ2S and the above equation can be written as
B (u (N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + x2σ2S (σ2v + σ2e))− (N − 1)uσ2vσ2e
B (u (N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + x2σ2S (σ2v + σ2e))− 2(N − 1)uσ2vσ2e
= Nx. (30)
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On the other hand, we have that
B =
¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1)σ2vσ2e + zσ2v¡
βPI
¢2
(N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + z (σ2v + σ2e)
= (31)
u (N − 1)σ2vσ2e + x2σ2Sσ2v
u (N − 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e)σ2e + x2σ2S (σ2v + σ2e)
.
We can now use this formula for B to rewrite equation (30) as
x2σ2Sσ
2
v
x2σ2Sσ
2
v − (N − 1)uσ2vσ2e
= Nx.
Since σ2v > 0 and σ
2
S > 0 this equation is equivalent to x = 0 or
(Nx− 1)xσ2S
N
=
(N − 1)uσ2e.
Replacing (N − 1)uσ2e =
(Nx− 1)xσ2S
N
in(31) we get
B =
(Nx− 1)xσ2Sσ2v +Nx2σ2Sσ2v
(Nx− 1)xσ2S (Nσ2v + σ2e) +Nx2σ2S (σ2v + σ2e)
.
But also, using the deÞnition of x we can write
B =
σ2v
(1− x) (Nσ2v + σ2e)
.
Note that 1− x cannot be 0 since 1
B
σ2v
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
> 0. So we have two expressions for B
and we equalize them obtaining the following equation in x :
σ2v
(1− x) (Nσ2v + σ2e)
=
(Nx− 1)xσ2Sσ2v +Nx2σ2Sσ2v
(Nx− 1)xσ2S (Nσ2v + σ2e) +Nx2σ2S (σ2v + σ2e)
,
or equivalent
1
(1− x) (Nσ2v + σ2e)
=
2Nx− 1
(Nx− 1) (Nσ2v + σ2e) +Nx (σ2v + σ2e)
.
This last equation has two solutions
x = 0 and x =
(N + 1) (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)−N (σ2v + σ2e)
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
.
First, if x = 0 then z = x2σ2S = 0 and it results β
SI = 1.
Then B =
σ2v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
and u = 0. But u = 0 implies βPI = 0 and from here
A = γ = 0 and the second order condition is not satisÞed.
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Second, we have that
x =
(N + 1) (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)−N (σ2v + σ2e)
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
=
N2σ2v + σ
2
e
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
Using this formula we can compute then
βSI =
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
, (32)
B =
2Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
and
u =
(Nx− 1)xσ2S
N(N − 1)σ2e
=
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e)σ2S
4 (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
2N2 (N − 1)σ2e
Notice that
¡
βPI
¢2
= u, so we need u ≥ 0. If N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e > 0 we have u ≥ 0
and consequently, we have solution for βPI and it is equal to
βPI =
1
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
s
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e)σ2S
(N − 1)σ2e
. (33)
Using the last equation in the system we can write also
C =
σ2v
βPI (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
= 2Nσ2v
s
(N − 1)σ2e
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e)σ2S
.
Next, since
βSI = NγPI(1− βSI)C,
we can Þnd an expression for γPI . Using the formulas for βSI (32) and C it results that
γPI =
βSI
N(1− βSI)C =
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N2σ2v
s
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)σ2S
(N − 1)σ2e (N2σ2v + σ2e)
. (34)
Similarly,
γSI = NγPI(1− Cγ) = NγPI(1− 2βSI) = − (N − 1)σ
2
e
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPI . (35)
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An important remark has to be made. The coefficient γSI < 0, however the second
order conditions are satisÞed since
(N − 1) γPI + γSI = N (N − 1) σ
2
v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPI > 0.
We compute now the ratio
γPI
βPI
because we will make use of it later on.
γPI
βPI
=
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
Nσ2v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
.
The only coefficients left to compute are αPI and αSI . We have from the system
that
αPI =
¡
(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ (v ¡1−A (N − 1) βPI −B¢−A(α−m))
and αSI = NγPI(v
¡
1− CNβPI¢− C(α−m))
We will Þrst compute t ≡ (α−m) and for that we use the deÞnition α = NαPI+αSI .
Thus, we have
(α−m) = N
µ
N (N − 1)σ2v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPI
¶
(w −A(α−m)) +NγPI(z − C(α−m))−m.
Solving for t ≡ (α−m) we obtain
t =
NγPIv
¡
N (N − 1)σ2v
¡
1−A (N − 1)βPI −B¢+ ¡1− CNβPI¢ (Nσ2v + σ2e)¢
((Nσ2v + σ
2
e) (1 +Nγ
PIC) + (N (N − 1)σ2v)ANγPI)
− m (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
((Nσ2v + σ
2
e) (1 +Nγ
PIC) + (N (N − 1)σ2v)ANγPI)
.
Using that
AβPI =
(N (N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
(N − 1) (N2σ2v + σ2e (2N − 1))
,
B =
2Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
and
CβPI =
σ2v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
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we have that the denominator is
NγPI
βPI
σ2v
µ
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
+N
(N (N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e (2N − 1))
¶
=
¡
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¢
N.
and the numerator is
NγPIv ((2N − 1)σ2e (N2σ2v + σ2e))
N2σ2v + σ
2
e (2N − 1)
−m ¡Nσ2v + σ2e¢ .
As a result,
t =
γPI ((2N − 1)σ2e (N2σ2v + σ2e))
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e (2N − 1)) (Nσ2v + σ2e)
v − m
N
.
We proceed now with the computations of the coefficients αPI and αSI . As we have
already seen
αPI =
¡
(N − 1)γPI + γSI¢ (v ¡1−A (N − 1)βPI −B¢−At),
and replacing the formulas we have obtained for A,B and t we obtain that
αPI =
N (N − 1)σ2v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPI
µ
σ2e (N (3N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 1))
N (N − 1)σ2v (N2σ2v + σ2e (2N − 1))
v +
A
N
m
¶
=
γPI
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
σ2e (N (3N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 1))
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e (2N − 1))
v +
(N − 1)σ2v
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPIAm
=
σ2e (N (3N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 1))
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
√
δv +
N (N − 2)σ2v − σ2e
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
Here we have deÞned δ by
δ ≡ (N(N − 2)σ
2
v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e)σ2S
(N − 1)σ2e
.
Similarly,
αSI = NγPI(v
¡
1− CNβPI¢− Ct) = µ−(N − 1)σ2eγPI
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
¶
v + CγPIm
=
µ
− (N − 1)σ
2
e
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
√
δ
¶
v +
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m.
Consequently, using the deÞnition of δ we can write the coefficients in the following
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way:
αPI =
σ2e (N (3N − 2)σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
v +
N (N − 2)σ2v − σ2e
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
βPI =
δ1/2
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γPI =
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
αSI =
µ
− (N − 1)σ
2
e
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1) σ2e
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
δ1/2
¶
v +
N2σ2v + (2N − 1) σ2e
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
βSI =
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
γSI = − (N − 1)σ
2
e
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N2σ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
δ1/2.
Proof of Corollary 1. While solving the above system we have obtained that
γ = NγPI + γSI =
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
µ
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (N2σ2v + σ2e) σ2S
(N − 1)σ2e
¶1/2
We study Þrst how market depth varies when the variance of liquidity shock eS varies.
We compute the derivative
∂γ
∂σ2S
and we obtain
∂γ
∂σ2S
> 0.
Then we calculate
∂γ
∂σ2e
and after somehow tedious calculations we obtain that
∂γ
∂σ2e
< 0.
Finally, we study how the variance of liquidation value, σ2v affects the market depth.
We calculate the derivative
∂γ
∂σ2v
and we obtain that this expression has the opposite
sign to f (σ2v) , where
f
¡
σ2v
¢
= N4
¡
σ2v
¢3
(N − 1) ¡N2 − 3N + 1¢− 3σ2eN2 ¡σ2v¢2 (2N − 1) (N − 1)
−3σ2v
¡
σ2e
¢2
N (2N − 1) (N − 1)− ¡σ2e¢3 (2N − 1) (N − 1) .
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We study this function and we obtain that the equation f 0 (σ2v) = 0,
f 0
¡
σ2v
¢
= 3 (N − 1)N
h³
N3
¡
σ2v
¢2 ¡
N2 − 3N + 1¢− 2σ2eN (2N − 1)σ2v − ¡σ2e¢2 (2N − 1)´i ,
has only one positive solution equal to
σ2e
(2N − 1) + (N − 1) ((2N − 1) (N − 1))1/2
N2 (N2 − 3N + 1) ≡ kl (N) .
We obtain that kl (N) >
1
N (N − 2) . So, it results that the function f (σ
2
v) is decreas-
ing for
σ2v
σ2e
∈
·
1
N (N − 2) , kl (N)
¸
, and is increasing for
σ2v
σ2e
> kl (N) . Since f (0) =
− (σ2e)3 (2N − 1) (N − 1) , it results that it exists k∗ (N,σ2e) such that f (k∗ (N,σ2e))
= 0. Therefore, the function f (σ2v) < 0 for any σ
2
v < k
∗ (N,σ2e) and is greater than 0
otherwise.
Once we have characterized the behavior of function f (σ2v) we can conclude that
the market depth is a increasing function of σ2v if σ
2
v < k
∗ (N,σ2e) and is decreasing
otherwise.
Proof of Corollary 2. From the market clearing condition (6) we obtain that the
equilibrium price is
ep = ¡NγPI + γSI¢−1Ãα+ βPI NX
n=1
ein − (1− βSI)eS −m! .
We had obtained in the proof of Proposition 1 that
α =
σ2e (2N − 1)
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
δ1/2v +
(N − 1)
N
m
NγPI + γSI =
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
2N2σ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
.
Using these formulas and the ones for βPI and βSI we can write that the equilibrium
price equals to
ep = σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
v +
Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
ein
− Nσ
2
v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS − 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m.
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Notice that since ein = ev + een we can write
ep = σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
v +
N2σ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
ev + Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
een
− Nσ
2
v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS − 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m.
Taking the expectations it results that E (ep) = v − 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m
Proof of Corollary 3. We have seen that the equilibrium price is given by (5). As
a result, we can compute the variance
V ar (ep) = V arÃ σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
v +
Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
ein
− Nσ
2
v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS − 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m
¶
=
N2 (N − 2) (σ2v)2 +Nσ2vσ2e (2N2 − 3N − 1)− (σ2e)2
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
µ
Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
¶2
.
Proof of Corollary 4. We compute now V ar (ev)−V ar (ev| ep). Due to the normality
assumptions we have that
V ar (ev)− V ar (ev| ep) = (V ar (ep))−1 (Cov (ev, ep))2
We calculate the covariance
Cov (ev, ep) = (Nσ2v)2
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
,
and together with the formula for variance V ar (ep) we obtained before, we plug them
above to obtain
V ar (ev)− V ar (ev| ep) = Nσ2v (N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
N2 (N − 2) (σ2v)2 +Nσ2vσ2e (2N2 − 3N − 1)− (σ2e)2
.
Proof of Corollary 5. Since the demand of the price informed agent xn can be
written as the sum of normal variables it results that xn is also a normal variable. The
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mean of xn is µn =
(N − 1)σ2v
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m while the variance σxn is
σxn = V ar (xn) =
Ã
(N − 1)σ2eδ1/2
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
v +
(N − 1)σ2v
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
+
δ1/2
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
ein − δ1/2
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
NX
n=1
ein + 1
2N
eS! =Ã
δ1/2
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
!2 ¡
σ2v + σ
2
e
¢
+
Ã
δ1/2
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
!2
N
¡
σ2v + σ
2
e
¢
+
1
4N2
σ2S =
(σ2v + σ
2
e) δ
4N2
µ
1
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
2 +
N
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
2
¶
+
σ2S
4N2
.
Then, since xn is N (µn,σxn) it results that the expected volume of trade
E (|xn|) =
∞Z
−∞
|xn| 1
σxn
√
2π
exp
Ã
−(xn − µn)
2
2σ2xn
!
dxn = 2µn +
µ
2
π
¶2
σxn =
2 (N − 1)σ2v
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m+
µ
2
π
¶2µ
(σ2v + σ
2
e) δ
4N2
µ
1
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
2 +
N
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
2
¶
+
1
4N2
σ2S
¶
.
Similarly, the quantity demanded by the supply informed agent is a normal variable
with mean µy =
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m and variance
σy = V ar(y) =
Ã
(N − 1)σ2eδ1/2
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
!2
N
¡
σ2v + σ
2
e
¢
+
1
4
σ2S
=
1
4
σ2S
µ
1 +
(N − 1)σ2e (N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (σ2v + σ2e)
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
2
¶
.
Then since y is N (µy,σy) it results that the expected volume of trade of the supply
informed agent is
E (|y|) =
∞Z
−∞
|y| 1
σy
√
2π
exp
Ã
−
¡
y − µy
¢2
2σ2y
!
dy = 2µy +
r
2
π
σy
= 2
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m+
µ
2
π
¶1/2
1
4
σ2S
µ
1 +
(N − 1)σ2e (N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e) (σ2v + σ2e)
N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
2
¶
.
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Proof of Corollary 6. Let us compute Þrst the unconditional expected proÞt of the
nth price informed trader.
ΠPIn = E
³gπPIn ´ = E ((ev − ep)fxn) .
Using the formulas we have obtained for ep and fxn we can write further
ΠPIn = E
ÃÃ
σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
(ev − v)− Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
een+
Nσ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS + 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m
¶
Ã
− δ
1/2 (N − 1)σ2e
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
(ev − v) + δ1/2
2N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
een
− 1
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
δ1/2
NX
k=1
eek + 1
2N
eS + (N − 1)σ2v
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
!
=
σ2vδ
1/2 (N − 1)σ2e
2N (N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) (Nσ2v + σ2e)
µ
N (Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
− (N − 1)σ
2
e
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
¶
+
+
(N − 1) σ2v
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
2Nσ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m2.
Let us compute now the unconditional expected proÞt of the supply informed trader.
Using the formulas we have obtained for ep and ey we can write further
ΠSI = E
³gπSI´ = E ((ev − ep) ey) .
ΠSI = E
ÃÃ
σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
(ev − v)− Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
een+
Nσ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS + 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
m
¶
Ã
(N − 1)σ2eδ1/2
2 (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
(ev − v) + (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m
+
(N − 1)σ2eδ1/2
2N (N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
NX
n=1
een + 1
2
eS! =
δ1/2 (N − 1)σ2eσ2v
2 (N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e)
µ
(N − 1)σ2e
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e) (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
+
N
(N(N − 2)σ2v − σ2e)
¶
+
2Nσ2v (Nσ
2
v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
(Nσ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + σ
2
e)
m2.
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The total proÞts in the market are
Π = NΠPI +ΠSI = E
Ã
(ev − ep)Ã NX
n=1
fxn + ey!! .
But from the market clearing condition it results that
Π = NΠPI +ΠSI = E
³
(ev − ep)³m+ eS´´ =
E
Ã
σ2e (2N − 1)
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
(ev − v)− Nσ2v
N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e
NX
n=1
een
+
Nσ2v (N
2σ2v + σ
2
e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
eS + 2Nσ2v (Nσ2v + σ2e)
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1) σ2e) δ1/2
m
¶³
m+ eS´
=
Nσ2v
(N2σ2v + (2N − 1)σ2e) δ1/2
¡¡
N2σ2v + σ
2
e
¢
σ2S + 2
¡
Nσ2v + σ
2
e
¢
m2
¢
.
We can check and see that indeed the proÞts we have obtained sum up to this
amount.
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